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Abstract
This article analyses, for the first time, the financial impact on the French market of September 11
th, 2001. Was 
there any information asymmetry around this date? How deep was the reaction of the French investors? This 
study measures the magnitude of the shock in the stock price process. 
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1. INTRODUCTION
One of the strong assumptions underlying the standard financial theory is that investors are perfectly 
informed about security returns. Tesar and Werner (1995) found strong evidence of a home bias concerning 
domestic investment portfolios. This home bias can be partly explained by the transaction costs, but also by the 
information  costs  that  are  defined  as  the  cost  of  collecting,  gathering  and  treating  the flow  of information 
required  for  asset  allocation. Merton  (1987) introduced a  modified  capital  asset  pricing  model  relaxing  the 
hypothesis of equal amount of information for each investor. This model of capital market equilibrium with 
incomplete information may provide some insights into the behavior of security prices. 
Bellalah and Jacquillat (1995) extended this version of CAPM with incomplete information to option valuation 
deriving an option formula taking into account an information cost for the option itself and another information 
cost for its underlying. This model is shown to correct some of the bias of the standard Black-Scholes (1973) 
model. 
In this article, we compare the out-of the sample performance of the information cost model (denoted 
ICM) with as benchmark, the jump diffusion model (denoted JDM) of Ball and Torous (1983, 1985). The idea is 
to assess the reaction of the French market during the terrorist attack in September 2001. Let’s recall some 
aspects of the total financial and economic damages of both events
1. For instance, according to the World Bank, 
twin towers’ attack may have cast 10 million more people to live in poverty in 2001 and 2002. According to the 
IMF the total loss is about 21 billion dollars representing around 0.07% of the U.S. total physical assets. The 
total cost amounts to about a quarter of annual US GDP, i.e. 2500 billion dollars 
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical models. Section 3 presents the sampling 
methodology. Section 4 presents the empirical results. Section 5 summarizes and concludes.
                                                
1 An excellent discussion on this subject is carried out by Philippe Jorion.2
2. THE MODELS
2.1. THE INFORMATION COST MODEL
We propose to implement the theoretical model of Bellalah and Jacquillat (1995) which is an extension 
of the Merton’s (1987) CAPM with  incomplete information. The central hypothesis in the  Merton’s (1987) 
model is that an investor includes a security  S in his portfolio only if he has some information concerning the 
first and the second moment of the return distribution. The value of a European call as derived by Bellalah and 
Jacquillat (1995) has the following form:
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with (.) N being the cumulative normal density function. The terms C  and S  correspond respectively to the 
information costs on the option and the underlying asset. When  C  = S  = 0, this formula collapses to the 
Black-Scholes (1973) formula. 
2.2. THE JUMP DIFFUSION MODEL
After  the  introduction  of  geometric  Brownian  motions,  much  attention  was  devoted  to  Poisson 
distributions as an alternative specification of stock returns. Large values of returns occur too frequently to be 
consistent with normality assumption. We assume that  S follows a log-normal jump diffusion, i.e., the addition 
of a geometric Brownian motion and a Poisson jump process.
Ball and Torous (1983, 1985) proposed a simplified version of the jump–diffusion model, where there 
will be at  most  one  jump  of constant size.  If no events  occur in  the  option life,  the  associated  probability 
is    1 and will be (  ) if one event occurs during this time interval. When such event occurs, there is an 
instantaneous jump in the stock price.  is the average rate of jump occurrence and k is the size of a jump.
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This formula corresponds to the Black-Scholes (1973) call option value weighted by the probability of a jump 
and by the probability of no jump with the stock price divided by the expected value of a jump     k 1 . 
3. DATA DESCRIPTIONS
The  call  options  database  covers  every  day  of September  2001.  This  database  can be  given,  upon 





These options are short-term European style PXL options written on the CAC 40 Index. We have in total 7015 
intra-daily call options. The database contains: the strike price, the futures price, the premium, the maturity and 
the risk-free interest rate. The maturities that are included go from 27 days to 6 days. The EURIBOR 1 month 
interest rate is used as a daily proxy of risk-free rate and was downloaded from DATASTREAM. The stream of 
dividends is also extracted from DATASTREAM.3
Figure 1 shows the intraday quotes of the CAC 40 index level and the implied volatility (IV) computed 
from PXL options by inverting the Black-Scholes (1973) formula for the data on September 11, 2001. The attack 
of the 09/11 occurred at 14h45 (north tower), 15h03 (south tower) and 15h43 (Pentagone) in Paris time. We note 
as usually the inverse relation between implied volatility  and the underlying  index. This is not the level  of 
realized  volatility,  but  only  the  level  of  an  implied  volatility  computed  from  closed-to-expiry  options.  We 
observe that the implied volatility surged strongly at 15h43 in Paris time.
Figure 1. Intraday pattern
4. THE OUT-OF-SAMPLE VALUATION ANALYSIS
4.1. THE ESTIMATION PROCEDURE
For  the  information  cost  model,  we  estimate  the  implied  volatility  ICM  ,  the  option  information 














) , , ( S C ICM ICM C    is the theoretical call option price of the model.
For the jump diffusion model, we estimate the jump occurrence parameter   , the jump size parameter  k and 
















) , , ( JDM JDM k C   is the theoretical call option price given by the jump diffusion model.
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Table 1. Implied Parameters
BS ICM JDM
Date BS  ICM  S  C  JDM   k
03/09/01 0.2443 0.2194 0.0910 0.0046 0.2139 0.7776 -0.1843
04/05/01 0.2382 0.2125 0.0931 0.0044 0.2069 0.7773 -0.1864
05/09/01 0.2415 0.2171 0.0963 0.0044 0.2121 0.7779 -0.1877
06/09/01 0.2627 0.2294 0.1330 0.0016 0.2243 0.7723 -0.2385
07/09/01 0.2787 0.2458 0.1371 0.0013 0.2409 0.7721 -0.2450
10/09/01 0.3115 0.3588 0.0503 0.0086 0.2638 0.7665 -0.2978
11/09/01 0.2943 0.3601 0.0454 0.0088 0.2815 0.7740 -0.1275
12/09/01 0.4523 0.3763 0.0565 0.0083 0.4063 0.7659 -0.3220
13/09/01 0.3547 0.3061 0.0325 0.0093 0.2765 0.7438 -0.5136
14/09/01 0.3621 0.3023 0.0323 0.0093 0.3306 0.7742 -0.2399
17/09/01 0.4829 0.4685 0.0801 0.0041 0.3914 0.7265 -0.7042
18/09/01 0.4102 0.3376 0.0395 0.0091 0.3329 0.7504 -0.5441
19/09/01 0.3708 0.2945 0.0273 0.0095 0.2927 0.7416 -0.6134
20/09/01 0.4433 0.3865 0.0379 0.0094 0.3661 0.7401 -0.6324
21/09/01 0.5041 0.4764 0.1671 0.0151 0.4085 0.7123 -0.9203
24/09/01 0.4811 0.4422 0.0686 0.0082 0.3932 0.7588 -0.6720
25/09/01 0.4158 0.3441 0.0404 0.0090 0.3861 0.7777 -0.2660
26/09/01 0.3491 0.3322 0.1370 0.0015 0.3020 0.7659 -0.4817
27/09/01 0.2834 0.2687 0.1219 0.0100 0.2665 0.7853 -0.2019
28/09/01 0.1562 0.1767 0.0071 0.0101 0.1553 0.7232 -0.0317
Average 0.3468 0.3178 0.0747 0.0073 0.2975 0.7744 -0.3808
We note that the three volatility measures seem to have the same behavior even if they differ by their 
values. It is not surprising to see that the Black-Scholes (1973) (denoted BS) implied volatility is the highest in 
average since the effect of the attack is absorbed by the jump parameter in the JDM and by the two information 
costs in the ICM. The effect of the attack is overall reflected the September 12
th, since it occurred less than three 
hours before the closing of the French market.
The BS implied volatility has increased by more than a half (53.68%) from September 11
th to 12
th while 
the JDM volatility has risen by 44.33%. The ICM volatility remained stable by a neglectible increase of 4.49%. 
However, on September 17
th, the ICM volatility has risen by 55% (33.4% for the BS volatility and 18.4% for the 
JDM).
At the same moment, in September 11
th, the CAC 40 index has decreased by 4.69% while the VX1
2
volatility index has increased by an amount of 105% according to the MONEP. The surge of the VX1 seems 
somehow exaggerated since we recall that this volatility index is computed from 2 calls and not from calls and 
puts like the German or US volatility indexes. It means that it contains an upward bias.
The option information cost C  has increased by 12% on September 13
th. Once it has decreased by half on the 
next trading day (September 17
th), the underlying information cost has increased by 48%. This means that a flow 
of information has appeared on September 17
th. It also means that French investors were driving their positions 
under information asymmetry from September 11
th to September 17
th.
The average annualized jump  occurrence  that is equal to  0.77 times per  year.  This  means that the 
probability that a jump is observed in average before the option expiration date is equal to 6.45%. The average 




th relative to the initial value on the 11
th. On September 17
th, 70.42% of the variation in the stock 
price process was explained by a jump.
The  French  option  market  has  reacted  to  the  attack  on  September  12
th but  the  strongest  reaction 
occurred on September 17
th. The main explanation is that the NYSE was closed from September, 11
th until 
September, 17
th. It is the longest closure of the NYSE since 1914 war. Therefore, the French market couldn’t 
import the necessary amount of volatility from its domestic market. This means that there was not transmission 
of information concerning the magnitude to give for this event. This explains why the underlying information 
cost has strongly surged on that date. Maillet and Michel (2002) used the Richter scale to compute the impact of 
various crises and found that the magnitude of the September 11
th was limited to one month.
Another point must be discussed. The amount of risk has been very high on September 21
st. We must 
recall that it corresponds to the blow up of the AZF chemical factory at Toulouse (France). On that day and even 
after, many people made a connection between the accident and the terrorist attack occurred ten days before. It 
                                                
2 The French volatility index (VX1) has a maturity length of 22 trading days.5
justifies the overreaction of the French investor on that precise day: 92% of the variation was explained by a 
jump in the stock price process and not by a volatility phenomenon
4.3. THE OUT-OF-THE-SAMPLE PRICING PERFORMANCE
To discuss the differences between observed prices and theoretical prices for an out-the-sample fit, we 
use the Absolute Percentage forecast Error (MAPE). We denote C , the observed price of the option and C ˆ , the 













Note that for the Table 2, the moneyness is computed as  1 ) (  K S . Deep out-of-the money (denoted 
DOTM) options corresponds to a moneyness inferior to -0.05; out-of-the money (denoted OTM) options belong 
to the interval [-0.05; -0.02[; at-the-money (denoted ATM) options belong to the interval [-0.02; 0.02[; in-the-
money (denoted ITM) options pertain to the interval [0.02; 0.05[ and deep in-the-money (denoted DITM) are 
superior or equal to 0.05. The pricing errors are computed as the difference between the actual call price and the 
theoretical price. 
Table 2. Comparison between ICM and JDM prices and observed prices for short term calls
ICM JDM
Moneyness MAPE PE MAPE PE
<-0.05 32.784 2.237 84.070 2.716
-0.05 to -0.02 0.386 4.504 0.295 1.885
-0.02 to 0.02 0.213 3.821 0.187 -1.821
0.02 to 0.05 0.066 3.106 0.085 -3.318
0.05 0.023 0.785 0.065 -14.104
All options 14.408 3.218 36.680 0.768
The best ex-ante fitting is made for DITM options while the worst ex-ante fitting is done by DOTM options. 
The mispricing is linear with the moneyness. This feature is not surprising and the use of a standard stochastic 
volatility model would have the same features, i.e, a strong mispricing for DOTM options. The pricing errors 
indicate that the bias is globally downward since the prices are underestimated. The ICM model performed twice 
better (in terms of MAPE measure) than a simple jump diffusion model in that turbulent period.
5. CONCLUSION
This article discusses the impact in the French option market of an international major event occurred in 
September, 11
th 2001. Two option pricing models are employed to quantify the impact of the terrorist attack on 
the French market: an information cost model and a jump diffusion model. 
The French market has reacted to the attack on September 12
th but overall on September 17
th when the NYSE re-
opened after 4 days of closure. Judging from the implicit parameters, both models have strongly reflected the 
magnitude of the shock.
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